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When it comes to employment, we have dug ourselves a tremendous hole. I will be surprised if unemployment is back to where it was four years from now. This chart gives us all an idea why:

Of particular interest is the path of the last two recessions which had anemic job growth despite relatively shallow initial dips. The recovery period for each far exceeded previous recessions. If we see a repeat this time the V shaped recovery in employment we keep hearing about is not going to happen. So why the difference?

The earlier recessions exhibited a similar pattern of sharp drops in employment followed by sharp recoveries as the economy snapped back. The change that we began to see in the 1990 recession is partly structural. The layoffs associated with the much larger manufacturing sector in recessions of the past were associated with a rundown in inventories which then snapped back once the inventories were depleted.

Something else is going on here as well in my own opinion. As the eighties gave way to the nineties the US was in the early stages of an experiment in monetary and economic policy. Monetary policy was explicitly geared to reduce economic volatility. This led to attempts to reduce the severity of recessions, and also led to a reduction in upside volatility as well. This was (at least for a while) somewhat successful, resulting in what became known as "The Great Moderation." The recession of 1990 was the first crack in that system. Attempts to limit volatility not only reduced the violence of the recession, but the explosive growth typical after recessions previously. It also was a recession which was a result of a financial crisis (the S&L's) and the real estate boom of the late eighties. The deleveraging of the finance and debt recession (what we are going through now, only in miniature) was sluggish. It took a good while for the adjustment to occur.

We followed a familiar script of lowering interest rates and encouraging credit expansion. Constant expansions of credit whenever things slowed kept the engine running until a bigger crisis hit with the bursting of the tech and telecom bubble. Once again we applied even more credit easing to soften the blow, and the attempt to avoid wringing the excesses of credit from the system led to another sluggish recovery with anemic job growth. Profits however were large and the return for the steadily growing financial sector was immense. If the economy was going to be stabilized by constant applications of credit expansion, then the financial sector was the main beneficiary. Finally we have the latest crisis, one where the financial system itself was the most important bubble.

What we can now see is that the types of recessions we have been experiencing are successive deleveraging cycles, each "solved" by releveraging the economy and leading to a bigger crisis down the road. Sadly deleveraging processes, especially if drawn out by keeping them from running their course, result in tepid job growth. We are now in a massive deleveraging cycle which we are once again trying to solve by adding massive debt to the system. Once again job growth and recovery is slower. Unless we break this cycle (which would be very painful) we should expect nothing different in the outcome, except that the problem is bigger and will last longer.

One of our favorite managers has released their Annual Report and shareholder letter. John Hussman's report can be found here (pdf.) We recommend that all of our clients read his letter as it describes our general concerns very well. We specifically recommend pages 6-9 under the title Present Conditions. If you are not a client, we recommend it as well.

Harold Evensky is busy fighting the good fight for those of us who believe it should be a legal duty for those who provide investment advice to put the clkients interest first. Or, to put it in other words, to act as fiduciaries:

Some of you may know, Congress is in the midst of debating revision of the 70+ year old laws governing the standards applicable to anyone providing investment advice and I’ve been active with a group of friends actively encouraging Congress to apply fiduciary standard to anyone providing investment advice. That’s not a real popular idea with some brokerage and insurance representatives. Some of their objections seem pretty incredible to me. For example:

Bruce Maisel, Vice President and Managing Counsel of Thrivent Financial for Lutherans testified on behalf of the American Council of Life Insurers in commenting on the proposed application of a fiduciary standard to anyone providing investment advice. “We strongly oppose any requirement of acting without regard to the financial interest of the broker or investment adviser”, he said. “That could chill the ability of brokers or advisers to provide advice”. He either does not understand the concept of fiduciary duty or, scary thought, could care less about the interest of the client. Imagine! Meeting the fiduciary standard of placing the client’s interest first could kill commerce. I guess in his insurance and brokerage world Caveat Emptor reigns supreme.

And, in an Investment News, David A Genelly, an attorney representing brokerage firms said, “Extending the investment adviser’s full-blown fiduciary duty to brokers acting in non discretionary accounts – i.e. merely those who “recommend” purchases – is fraught with so much potential mischief that it undoubtedly has the plaintiff’s securities bar rubbing their already sweaty palm together with glee over prospects. A broker is a broker, and an adviser is an adviser. If brokers are now going to have the same fiduciary duties that advisers have, simply because they render some adjunct investment advice when we make recommendations, there is no telling where the liability will stop [my emphasis].” I guess if you ever receive “adjunct” investment advice you’d better take it with a grain of salt, or, better yet, maybe you should run for the exit.

The good news is, Congress seems to recognize the importance of linking investment advice to a fiduciary standard and I’m optimistic that in a month or so the financial services worlds will enter a new era of fiduciary responsibility. If you’re interested in learning more about this issue, check out the Committee for the Fiduciary Standard web site at: http://www.thefiduciarystandard.org.

I  should be make this clear. I have no problem with brokerage. The sale and provision of financial products is a necessary part of serving clients, and we use brokers on our clients behalf. The distinction is on the matter of advice. Most brokers do not make sure that clients understand that they are representing an organization which does not require that they put the clients interests first, and that their job is to sell their companies products. As Bruce states above, they oppose the idea that they should have to act without regard to the interests of the broker or advisor. They believe their own interests should be first.

Many brokers of course do attempt to put their clients interests first, but they and/or their firm don't want the legal liability of being required to do so.

Our own position is simple. If you are selling a product, that is what you are doing, and should make it clear to the client that that is what you are doing. Nobody expects the car salesman to be doing anything other than trying to get you to buy their car. Buying products from a broker should carry the same clear expectations. The broker should not be allowed to claim the mantle in the clients eye that they are required to put your interests first. If the broker wishes to claim to be giving advice and not selling you something, then they should have to be held legally responsible for putting the clients interests first. It is that simple.

Occasionally you read something that makes you go "WOW!" Jeremy Grantham in at least half of his Quarterly Letters comes close. The other half of the time he definitely scores.

Another person who generally has the same effect, and like Jeremy was a true hero to clients who really listened over the last decade, is James Montier. First at Dresdner Kleinwort, and then Société Générale (with another gem, his colleague Albert Edwards) James expounded on value investing, behavioral finance and the perils of modern finance. Not that the bankers of Société Générale listened.

In a career move that makes perfect sense James has now joined Jeremy at GMO. With James and Ben Inker the GMO team will deserve respect long after Jeremy is gone.

Which gets me back to WoW!

James has produced an analysis of the crisis and its aftermath that is close to perfect. Not only are the ten points and his discussion enlightening in and of themselves, but the wisdom of other great investors is liberally sprinkled throughout. This is one of those pieces that says exactly what I think about a host of issues, but better. Here are a few highlights:

Lesson 1: Markets aren’t efficient.

One would think this would be obvious by now, but no, it isn't to many.

Lesson 2: Relative performance is a dangerous game.

Personally I believe that it is to the benefit of those of us who refuse to play the relative performance game, but managers, consultants and the industry in general conspire against looking at things differently. On the subject of the industries obsession with deciding how to categorize returns as alpha or beta or any number of ever finer benchmarks:

Sadly, these concepts are nothing more than a distraction from the true aim of investment, which as the late, great Sir John Templeton observed is, “Maximum total real returns after tax.”

Such a simplistic mind you have James worrying about what ends up in the bank account rather than beating a benchmark or proving your results are "alpha" rather than beta. It is also nice to see James noticing studies which show managers can beat an index, they bizarrely choose not to. Go figure.

Lesson 3: The time is never different.

We better hope it is this time, because the history of collapsing credit bubbles certainly argues for several years of economic distress.

Lesson 4: Valuation matters.

Ultimately nothing has a greater impact on returns in the stock market than the price you pay. This is consistently denigrated but consistently proves true over time:

Graham and Dodd PE basket

Oh, and in case you were wondering, we presently reside on the expensive end of that chart.

Lesson 5: Wait for the fat pitch.

The problem with this is that investors are impatient:

As tempting as it may be to be a “man of action,” it often makes more sense to act only at extremes. But the discipline required to “do nothing” for long periods of time is not often seen. As noted above, overt myopia also contributes to our inability to sit back, trying to understand the overall investment backdrop.

Waiting for the "fat pitch" as Warren Buffett calls it requires one to realize:

  1. cash is a position
  2. that it is okay not to do as well as everyone else while waiting for the right opportunity
  3. the necessity of investing in opportunities not dependent on the stock markets direction
  4. that you should respect dividends
  5. you need to act when everyone else is in a state of panic
  6. that it is only useful to panic if you do so before everyone else!

Warren Buffett often speaks of the importance of waiting for the fat pitch – that perfect moment when patience is rewarded as the ball meets the sweet spot. However, most investors seem unable to wait, forcing themselves into action at every available opportunity, swinging at every pitch, as it were.

Lesson 6: Sentiment matters.

The more enthusiastic investors are, the more cautious you should be, and vice versa.

Lesson 7: Leverage can’t make a bad investment good, but it can make a good investment bad!

In and of itself modest leverage can help a good investment, but only if you can live with the volatility long enough for the good investment to pay off. Excessive leverage destroys the ability to hold.

Lesson 8: Over-quantification hides real risk.

James quotes the great Ben Graham:

Mathematics is ordinarily considered as producing precise and dependable results; but in the stock market the more elaborate and abstruse the mathematics the more uncertain and speculative are the conclusions we draw there from ... Whenever calculus is brought in, or higher algebra, you could take it as a warning that the operator was trying to substitute theory for experience, and usually also to give to speculation the deceptive guise of investment.

This lesson especially appeals to me. As a long time fan of the "Its Bigger Than a Bread Box" school of investing I cannot agree more with the false sense of certainty and its dangers in applied investing. What I mean by "bigger than a bread box" goes back to lesson 6 and it paying most to act at extremes. Precision is not only unattainable then, but irrelevant. Look for something so important that getting it exactly right isn't important. Everything else will likely amount to no more than short term noise. I remember an investment committee meeting in early 2008 as the downturn we had been preparing for was in its early innings. The debate was going back and forth over how bad things might get. I decide it was time to cut to the chase:

Debating how bad things might get is like arguing after you have fallen off a building whether it is a 30 or 60 story fall. Either way you are dead. The real solution is the same either way, don't fall off the damn building!

We moved on to how we should protect our capital and hopefully even profit from the coming collapse. Here is another gem from James on how trying to mathematically calculate risk distracts us from what really matters:

In a depressing parody of the “build it and they will come” mentality, the risk management industry seems to believe “measure it, and it must be useful.” In investing, all too often risk is equated with volatility. This is nonsense. Risk isn’t volatility, it is the permanent loss of capital. Volatility creates opportunity. As Keynes noted, “It is largely fluctuations which throw up the bargains and the uncertainty due to fluctuations which prevents other people from taking advantage of them.”


We would be far better off if we abandoned our obsession with measurement in favor of understanding a trinity of risks. From an investment point of view, there are three main paths to the permanent loss of capital: valuation risk (buying an overvalued asset), business risk (fundamental problems), and financing risk (leverage). By understanding these three elements, we should get a much better understanding of the true nature of risk.

Interestingly, it is valuation risk which has proved hardest to avoid, and causes the most lasting damage to investors portfolios.

Lesson 9: Macro matters.

Big macro economic events can destroy what seems normal when it comes to valuation. The big risks need to be accounted for, even when they seem unlikely (bonus wisdom from the great Jean Marie Eveillard:

It often pays to remember the wise words of Jean-Marie Eveillard. “Sometimes, what matters is not so much how low the odds are that circumstances would turn quite negative, what matters more is what the consequences would be if that happens.” In terms of finance jargon, expected payoff has two components: expected return and probability. While the probability may be small, a truly appalling expected return can still result in a negative payoff.


[...]


Neither top-down nor bottom-up has a monopoly on insight. We should learn to integrate their dual perspectives.

Lesson 10: Look for sources of cheap insurance.

If low probability but disastrous events need to be accounted for, then finding ways to cheaply mitigate, or even profit from, them is important. Even if it is in the short term a drag on performance. Quality balance sheets in your stock holdings are cheap insurance right now, so are other strategies. We are closely looking at where cheap insurance can be found. Read Ten Lessons Not learnt

On the heels of last weeks delightfully mixed bag of employment data (job creation looks like it may be out of reverse and into neutral) we get some new housing data. There the signals are more disquieting, if expected (at least by me.) The housing market may now be heading back down.

The interesting aspect of this is that so many people see this as unlikely. So let us list some reasons why this is a real risk, if probably not as rapid a fall as we saw previously.

Read more...

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